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From Philanthropy to “Altruism”: Incorporating Unselfish Behavior 
into Economics, 1961-75 
 
 
Throughout the 1960s, reaching a peak in the eventful year 1968, evidence of 
social crisis continued to mount, putting significant strain on economists’ 
customary reliance on the harmonizing effects of the invisible hand. The 
unhappy consequences of the significant changes affecting Western societies 
reminded economists that selfishness and self-reliance alone do not suffice to 
achieve social cohesion. In the appendix to The Logic of Collective Action, 
Mancur Olson (1971) made it clear that, in economics, such changes could be 
addressed by focusing on the issue of collective goods and externalities 
(congestion, pollution, crime, health status, etc.), and observed that their 
increase could “add to the amount of divisiveness and conflict in society” (173). 
With his 1965 book, Olson had convincingly argued that the invisible hand of 
the market had failures that the discipline tended to overlook. His endeavor was 
indicative of a more general concern for the problem of achieving socially 
desirable outcomes on the basis of numerous self-interested actions, a concern 
that encouraged a turn towards the consideration of seemingly unselfish 
behavior. 
 That the publication of Gary Becker’s “A Theory of Social Interactions” at the 
end of 1974 is often considered the starting point of the renewed interest in 
unselfish behavior, more than a convenient historical short cut, is a clear 
indication that such a behavior had by then been integrated into the utility-
maximization framework. The customary emphasis on the foundational nature 
of Becker’s article obliterates some of the significant features of unselfishness 
research beforehand, especially from the circulation of seminal and largely 
unknown articles on philanthropy in the early 1960s. Faced with the problem of 
accounting for seemingly unselfish behavior in a subject that relied primarily on 
the assumption of self-interested agents, some economists strove to 
accommodate concern for the welfare of others within the self-interest model, 
whereas others tried instead to supplement it with an ethically inspired model—
two orientations illustrated by Sen’s (1973, 1977) distinction between 
“sympathy” and “commitment.”i 
 Two broad issues informed the economic analysis of unselfishness in the 
early 1960s. The first concerns what has come to be called the redefinition of 
the boundaries between economics and the other social sciences (see 
Swedberg 1991, 23-27). Most economists who took part in the rekindling of 
interest in unselfishness challenged existing definitions of the “economic” and 
the “social.” To the extent that unselfish behavior had often been regarded as 
belonging to the “social” more than the “economic” after World War Two, it is 
unsurprising that its study mobilized partisans of an all-encompassing 
economics and those more open to the potential lessons of other social 
sciences. The second issue has to do with the redefinition of the utility function. 
The increasing use of utility interdependence in models of unselfish behavior 
from the 1960s translated itself into the inclusion of arguments related to others 
in the individual’s utility function. This raises the question of the nature of these 
arguments, with the main distinction being between resources given away for 
the benefit of others and goods available to them although one can think of 
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utility functions including both. Here the study of unselfish behavior 
distinguished two qualitatively different conceptions: what Becker calls the 
“usual theory of consumer choice” and his “social interactions” approach.ii 
 Now that unselfishness is part and parcel of economics, notably since the 
inclusion of an “Altruism” heading in the Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) 
Classification System for Journal Articles at the end of 1993, we are in a 
position to consider how it came to be so between Becker’s (1961), Kenneth 
Boulding’s (1962) and William Vickrey’s (1962) analyses of philanthropy in the 
early 1960s and the publication of the first collection of essays devoted to 
“altruism” (Phelps 1975).iii Drawing on archival material and oral history, the 
present study addresses the following questions: Who were the main instigators 
of this renewed interest in unselfish behavior? What led them to this topic and 
what were they trying to achieve? What directions did they and others follow 
and for what reasons? 
 
1. Economists on Philanthropy 
 
In the postwar era, the economists’ model of human behavior was economic 
man, an agent assumed to act self-interestedly, nay selfishly. Known for 
economizing on love (Dennis Robertson [1955] 1956), economists were not 
necessarily equipped to deal with unselfishness. Starting with a study of 
philanthropy in the American economy, however, a small “invisible college” 
gradually built up in which a number of economists began to study those very 
situations where unselfish motives were supposed to predominate.  
 
1.1. A Few Lone Voices 
 
Boulding’s (1973) The Economy of Love and Fear, Becker’s (1974) “A Theory 
of Social interactions” and Edmund Phelps’s (1975) Altruism, Morality, and 
Economic Theory have often been greeted as instrumental in the upswing of 
interest in unselfishness. More than a decade before these works came out, 
however, a handful of articles had offered valuable insights into aspects of 
unselfish behavior (Becker 1961; Boulding 1962; Vickrey 1962). In retrospect, 
these contributions appeared as the first notable attempts to overcome the 
limitations imposed by economists’ usual concentration on selfish motives in the 
analysis of human behavior. Originally, they were not meant as such, however. 
They all were associated with a study of philanthropy in the American economy, 
to be conducted in 1959-62, by the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) under a grant from the Russell Sage Foundation (RSF). 
Since the early 1950s, the tax status of private foundations had come under 
vigorous attack because of financial abuses and politicized grants, and in the 
early 1960s “Congressman Wright Patman, a populist from Texas, launched 
what would become an eight-year inquiry into the grantmaking and 
management practices of foundations” (Peter Frumkin 1999, 70). It is in this 
adverse context that, following informal discussions in the late 1950s, Donald 
Young, the President of the RSF, asked Solomon Fabricant, Director of 
Research at the NBER, to give thought to the possibilities of fruitful research in 
the economic aspects of philanthropy. Fabricant solicited suggestions from his 
colleagues at the NBER and eventually wrote to Young, attaching a 
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“Memorandum on a Study of the Changing Position of Philanthropy in the 
Economy,” mainly concerned with improving measurement of philanthropic 
activities. At the end of November 1958, Fabricant received the response of the 
RSF, granting the $170,000 requested and in the next few months he started to 
organize the study on philanthropy referred to above, obtaining the services of 
Frank G. Dickinson, a professor of economics at Northern Illinois University, as 
Director of the project. Ralph Nelson from the NBER staff was associated with 
the study and an Advisory Committee on Philanthropy was formed with Young 
and others.iv 
In October 1959, after Dickinson had moved to New York, William J. Carson, 
the Executive Director of the NBER, wrote to the members of the Advisory 
Committee to inform them of its first meeting; he attached a slightly altered and 
shortened version of the Fabricant Memorandum. Concomitantly, Dickinson 
produced his own “Notes.” The latter he circulated prior to the meeting and 
subsequently read before the members of the Advisory Committee, among 
whom Andrews, who had previously directed the work in the field of 
philanthropic studies at the RSF. Members of the NBER staff were also there, 
among whom Becker, Fabricant, Nelson and C. Harry Kahn. In his “Notes,” 
Dickinson observed that philanthropy had not been in the main stream of 
economic analysis and attributed part of such an omission to the fact that 
economists were concerned with “problems of supply and demand, cost and 
price and, in general, with what we might call the market place.” Accordingly, it 
was suggested that participants in the meeting write a memorandum “pointing 
out what appear … the most significant changes in philanthropy during the last 
thirty years” and that members of the Advisory Committee “draft a second 
statement setting forth … suggestions for conference papers and possible 
authors.” On the latter issue, suggestions of various sorts led Fabricant to make 
arrangements with Willard L. Thorp of the Merrill Center for Economics to hold a 
conference on philanthropy. It was thus decided that a preliminary statement 
would be sent to five people who were to prepare the papers for the 
conference, namely, economists Boulding, Eli Ginzberg and Vickrey, University 
of Wisconsin historian Merle Curti, and Covington Hardee, a lawyer and 
member of the Advisory Committee.v 
 In the wake of the first meeting of the Advisory Committee, Fabricant 
produced “An Economist’s View of Philanthropy” and Dickinson wrote a “Report 
to Staff Conference,” which he later reworked and retitled “The Growth of 
Private and Public Philanthropy.” These two papers dealt mainly with 
definitional and empirical aspects of philanthropy: the former pointed to the 
paucity of statistics, misconceptions about giving, the difficulties to disentangle 
motives and, more generally, the inadequacy of the conception of economic 
man; despite its attempt to clarify the concept, the latter did not bring much in 
the way of building an economic analysis of philanthropy. Appearing in 
Philanthropy and Public Policy, a collection edited by Dickinson after the 
conference, in 1962, they had benefited from a limited circulation, notably at the 
NBER, at the end of 1960, where they were meant to provoke reactions. 
Becker’s “Notes on an Economic Analysis of Philanthropy” was actually one of 
these. 
 This obscure paper of April 1961 was, on Becker’s own admission, his first 
contribution to the theory of unselfishness. Never published, it inspired another 
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unpublished paper, the 1968 “Interdependent Preferences: Charity, 
Externalities, and Income Taxation,” on which Becker’s 1974 “A Theory of 
Social Interactions” was partly based: 
 
My interest in interactions can probably be traced to a study of 
discrimination and “prejudice” where I analyzed discriminatory behavior 
by incorporating the race, religion, sex, or other personal characteristics 
of employees, fellow workers, customers, dealers, neighbors, etc., into 
utility functions. . . . Subsequently, in order to provide a theoretical 
framework for a study of philanthropy by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research, I incorporated the standard of living of “poorer” persons into 
the utility functions of “richer” ones. (1974, 1065) 
 
Becker thus viewed the study of philanthropy as an extension of his work on 
discrimination; as such, it was anything but another attempt to apply the 
maximization framework with utility interdependence to the study of 
“noneconomic” topics.vi 
 Becker’s “Notes” was not the only outgrowth of the Fabricant and Dickinson 
project. Sponsored by the NBER and the Merrill Center for Economics, a 
conference took place in Southampton, Long Island, in June 1961; it was meant 
to encourage reflection on the following questions: 
 
What is the appropriate “division of labor” among government, the 
market, and private philanthropy, in meeting human needs most 
effectively? Have the appropriate lines of division changed; do they 
continue to change; in what direction should they change? Should 
government continue to subsidize (or encourage) private philanthropy 
through the various provisions of the tax system. . . ? Should government 
expand or contract its direct support, or alter the ways in which it directly 
supports private philanthropy? What of the respective roles of the federal, 
state and local governments? Should philanthropy, for purposes of 
governmental support, be redefined in any way? In what directions should 
private philanthropy concentrate its efforts, taking account of past and 
prospective expansion of governmental activities and of market 
developments. . . ? What media of giving should be favored by private 
givers? 
 
The effort to defend private philanthropy and the need for better knowledge of 
its economic role were certainly essential in prompting foundation leaders to 
approach economists for advice. With Boulding’s exception, the theoretical 
responses provided in the process were not so much indications of a real 
interest in the gift economy as circumstantial outcomes of varied research 
endeavors. That the latter converged on the occasion of a conference on 
philanthropy did not mean they would coalesce into a unified theory of 
unselfishness at a later stage. 
 Vickrey, Becker’s colleague at Columbia at the time, Boulding and James 
Buchanan attended the conference. As a public finance theorist, Buchanan had 
familiarity with some of the broad questions raised by the conference and the 
implications of a change in foundation tax exemptions could easily resonate 
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with his interest in fiscal theory. Being attached to limited government, 
moreover, he probably regarded private philanthropic activity as an integral and 
vital part of American democracy. As to Boulding and Vickrey, they wrote 
specially for the conference: the former authored “Notes on a Theory of 
Philanthropy,” which, despite a title reminiscent of Becker’s mimeographed, had 
been written independently of it; the latter, slightly altering the title of Fabricant’s 
article, proposed “One’s Economist View of Philanthropy,” thereby suggesting 
that it was premature to hope for a unified viewpoint on the subject. Together 
with Becker’s article, these two works represented the most articulate 
contributions to the nascent economic theory of philanthropy; the other 
contributions, commissioned by Fabricant for the conference, were less 
economically oriented but had much informative value.vii 
 Philanthropy was not among Vickrey’s main interests; yet, it was not an 
established area of economic research and its study could therefore take 
curious paths. Perhaps the most obvious connection between the questions of 
the conference and the work of Vickrey was his old and lasting interest in the 
tax system, which had materialized in a Ph.D. dissertation on progressive 
taxation in 1948. In view of the preoccupations that motivated the conference, 
Vickrey reached a rather unsettling conclusion: “The unacknowledged and 
haphazard array of subsidies that result from present special tax privileges call 
for replacement with more uniform and explicit arrangements that can be 
brought into line with desirable public policy” (1962, 56). Some aspects of his 
(1945) predoctoral work on the foundation of the utilitarian social welfare 
function also indirectly related to unselfish behavior, in particular, its description 
of an individual hypothetically choosing between various income distributions 
without knowing his or her position in the chosen distribution. This formulation 
described the impersonality of the individual’s judgment concerning social 
welfare and as such it clearly departed from the customary depiction of 
economic man as self-interested. One year or so before he presented his paper 
on philanthropy in Long Island, Vickrey (1960) came back to the issue of 
impersonality in his “Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules.” There, again, 
he considered the valuation of various social states by individuals, showing that 
the significant issue was to determine which role to give to others in the 
construction of the social welfare function—an issue that could encourage 
interesting extensions to the analysis of philanthropic activities. 
 Vickrey approached philanthropy from the perspective of a welfare and public 
finance economist, that is, with the conviction that “a pure competitive economic 
system, even if it could be realized, would be far too rigid and heartless to serve 
as the economic basis for a tolerable society. To be viable at all, such a system 
must provide at least some softening of the corners and relaxation of the rigid 
rule of self-interest” (1962, 31). The economic study of philanthropy in society 
paralleled the effort to establish the place to be given to others in the 
construction of the individual’s social welfare function. Logically, the discussion 
of philanthropy again took income distribution as its main illustration. In 1945 
and in 1960, Vickrey had addressed the individual’s hypothetical choice of a 
given economy with a given distribution of income as determined by the 
condition that, an economy once chosen, the individual has an equal chance of 
landing in the shoes of each member of society. With the study of philanthropy, 
the question was less to choose among various hypothetical income 
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distributions than to determine whether charitable redistributions of income 
affect the actual income distribution. Vickrey found that “the role of philanthropy 
in redistribution is relatively slight” (45). His conclusion derived from an analysis 
of giving, in which an individual, say A, is supposed to show either sympathy 
(“empathy” in Vickrey’s words) or antipathy (“rivalry”) for others depending on 
whether they are situated right below or just above himself or herself in the 
scale of income or economic status. By subtracting the negative element of the 
interaction from its positive element, Vickrey arrived at the “neighborhood 
effect,” which indicates the degree of satisfaction A derives from contributing to 
the welfare of others variously situated along the scale of income. In closing his 
analysis of how interdependence prompts charitable giving, Vickrey remarked: 
“Of course, in addition to distances measured by income or economic status, 
there will also be distances in terms of age, race, culture, geographic location, 
and other characteristics to which a similar discussion might apply” (44). While 
these factors may have been of peripheral significance in Vickrey’s analysis of 
giving, they were central to Boulding’s. 
 Boulding came to the analysis of philanthropy from investigating social 
organizers, namely, threat, exchange and love. Consigning threat to political 
science and love to sociology, economists usually concentrated on exchange. 
Boulding, who did not attach much importance to the traditional division of 
territories in social science, preferred to regard these three aspects of human 
behavior as many ways of organizing social systems. In the 1940s, while 
shifting away from being a pure economist, he had good hopes that an 
integrated social science would help create an integrated society. With the 
militarization of American society in the 1950s, however, the devout Quaker 
became increasingly aware of disintegrative forces; accordingly, most of his 
attention was turned to the question of conflict resolution, as illustrated by his 
role in the creation of The Journal of Conflict Resolution in 1957 and the 
launching of the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution in 1959. At about 
the same time, society stabilization, taken as the determination of the right 
proportions between the threat, exchange and integrative systems became his 
main concern. Boulding eventually finalized the view of society in terms of the 
three social organizers in early 1962 after he had written his paper for the 
philanthropy conference (see Fontaine 2006). 
 Boulding’s “Notes on a Theory of Philanthropy” was published in the 
Dickinson volume in 1962. For Boulding, the excessive concentration of 
economists on exchange explained their neglect of philanthropy. Like Becker 
and Vickrey, he believed that, assuming positive utility interdependence, utility 
theory could explain charitable gifts. In other words, it was rational for an 
individual to use part of his or her income for the benefit of others, the 
determining factor being the weight he or she attached to their utility in his or 
her utility function. In a sense, Boulding revived the tradition of Edgeworth’s 
“coefficients of effective sympathy,” which accounts for interdependence on the 
basis of a propinquity argument (see Appendix to Boulding 1962 and David 
Collard 1975). Yet, while depicting “genuine philanthropy,” that is, “gifts for 
which there is no identifiable quid pro quo even in the shape of a personal 
gratification,” Boulding pointed to the following motivation: “It is this capacity for 
empathy—for putting oneself in another’s place, for feeling the joys and sorrows 
of another as one’s own—which is the source of genuine gift. It is because … 
8 
the very realization of our own identity implies in some sense that there is a 
common identity in humanity, that we are willing to ‘socialize’ our substance and 
to share with the afflicted” (1962, 61).viii It was because people were able to put 
themselves in each other’s shoes that gifts were given and agents could be said 
to have interdependent utility functions. Boulding did not capitalize on empathy 
to provide a truly distinct approach to philanthropy, however. As he subjected 
the individuals’ sense of community to its size, noting that “the larger the 
community …; the more tenuous the sense of identity” (62), he ignored the 
possibility offered by the imagined change of positions to account for giving to 
total strangers. Excluding strangers from the ranks of philanthropy’s 
beneficiaries, the empathy-related view of philanthropy continued to rely on a 
propinquity argument. 
 Looking at the three main theoretical incursions into philanthropy in the early 
1960s, one sees varied motivations at work. For Becker, the study of 
philanthropy was but one marginal aspect of a broader endeavor to apply the 
maximization framework outside economics’ traditional scope. Had he not been 
associated with the NBER, Becker would have probably not looked into 
philanthropy. At the time, human capital analysis was more of a top priority to 
him. In effect, Becker did not come back to philanthropy before the late 1960s. 
As to Vickrey, his main interest was in public finance and welfare economics, 
which explained why his contribution to the analysis of philanthropy remained 
occasional. Had he not been invited to present a paper, it is doubtful he would 
have considered this topic otherwise than peripherally. Yet, others, showing 
greater uneasiness over the neoclassical approach to public finance and the 
social welfare function apparatus, could readily recognize themselves with 
some of Vickrey’s considerations on unselfishness and explore them further. 
Finally, Boulding came to philanthropy through his long-standing conviction that 
economists unduly concentrated on exchange and that reforming the discipline 
necessitated more attention being given to the study of the “integrative system.” 
By the late 1950s, with his opening up to a general theory of human behavior, 
Boulding had a real interest in the theory of the gift and was somewhat aware of 
the anthropologists’ analysis. With his estrangement from economics amplifying 
in the 1960s, it is little surprise that he continued to pursue this line of 
research.ix 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2. A Small “Invisible College” 
 
Following the contributions by Becker, Vickrey and Boulding, various research 
efforts gave the economic study of philanthropy more visibility and some 
semblance of unity. By the time he attended the NBER conference in June 
1961, Buchanan had established himself as one of the leading figures in the 
discussion over the construction of a theory of public finance and definition of 
the social welfare function.x Of the latter the Chicago-trained economist 
provided a substantive discussion centered on the logical inconsistency 
attached to the notion of social rationality. In pursuing the former he insisted on 
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considering the expenditure and the tax sides of the fiscal process 
interdependently. This in turn allowed for a clearer understanding of the effects 
of fiscal systems in terms of income redistribution and accordingly placed the 
fiscal specialist (provided that he adhered to the “individualistic” theory of the 
state) in a better position to issue recommendations for policy makers. In early 
1960, following a decade of prosperity during which economists had had ample 
opportunity to demonstrate their expertise in the management of the American 
economy (see Michael Bernstein, 2001, Ch. 5), Buchanan (1960, 234) 
published a review article of Richard A. Musgrave’s highly influential The 
Theory of Public Finance—“the first English-language treatise in the field.” In its 
close attention to the philosophical foundations of the theory of government 
finance, this review article echoed “The Pure Theory of Government Finance: A 
Suggested Approach” of 1949. Buchanan concentrated on the book’s first two 
parts, which dealt with Musgrave’s approach to fiscal theory and addressed 
questions of interest to the construction of a theory of collective choice. 
Although he acknowledged the usefulness of Musgrave’s tripartite division of 
the governmental budget between the allocation branch, the distribution branch 
and the stabilization branch for the understanding of governmental activities, 
Buchanan criticized its normative ambitions for implying a confusion between 
the “organismic” and the “individualistic” approaches to fiscal theory, which he 
had clearly separated in the late 1940s. At the normative level, then, he 
suggested “an alternative approach which can incorporate all public activity 
under only one of these three branches.” This meant that individual evaluations, 
rather than external norms, had to be taken into account in determining the 
objectives of the three governmental functions and that “both ‘redistribution’ and 
‘stabilization’ can be treated as satisfying ‘social wants’ ” (236). In view of the 
above, it should be clear why questions raised by the 1961 conference, such as 
“What is the appropriate ‘division of labor” among government, the market, and 
private philanthropy, in meeting human needs most effectively?” stroke a chord 
with Buchanan. 
 A couple of years after he attended the philanthropy conference, Buchanan 
began to work on “What Should Economists Do?”—his Presidential Address to 
the Southern Economic Association. While preparing for this lecture, he read 
“Towards a Pure Theory of Threat Systems,” in which Boulding restated the 
tripartite view of social organizers. Instead of the term “love,” he was now 
speaking of the “integrative relationship, which involves a ‘meeting of minds’ 
(that is, a convergence in the images and the utility functions of the parties 
towards each other)” (1963, 425). Buchanan ([1964] 1979) did not linger over 
the imagined change of positions which provided a justification for such a 
convergence and which Kenneth Arrow (1963) was briefly addressing through 
the misnamed principle of extended sympathy in the recently published 
(second) edition of Social Choice and Individual Values. The reference to 
Boulding was meant primarily to stress that exchange did not cover the choices 
associated with situations of pure conflict or integrative systems ([1964] 1979, 
28). With Boulding, Buchanan shared dissatisfaction with the narrowness of 
economics and accordingly he proposed to reconsider its boundaries with 
politics. While dealing with the free-rider problem, for example, he contemplated 
solutions ranging from sophisticated exchange arrangements to political 
arrangements.xi 
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 Prior to addressing the Southern Economic Association in November 1963, 
Buchanan (and Tullock) had had time to consult the manuscript of The Logic of 
Collective Action, to which Olson was putting the finishing touches, after he had 
received comments from Thomas Schelling, his research advisor at Harvard, 
and Edward Banfield, the Harvard political scientist. A year and a half later, in 
mid-1965, the book came out, arousing much interest among economists and 
political scientists alike. The originality of its purpose notwithstanding, The Logic 
contained a rather traditional message in terms of the analysis of human 
behavior. As of the Introduction, Olson criticized social scientists for maintaining 
that groups act in their interests because their members act out of self-interest. 
Using a reductio ad absurdum argument, he wrote: “If the individuals in a group 
altruistically disregarded their personal welfare, it would not be very likely that 
collectively they would seek some selfish common or group objective” ([1965] 
1971, 1). Olson was aware that groups composed of “altruistic” individuals 
might act in their common interests, but he regarded this logical possibility as 
having no practical relevance (2). Mostly interested in finding solutions to the 
undesirable consequences of self-interested behavior in group situations—the 
fact that self-interested individuals do not necessarily act to achieve their group 
interest—Olson quickly dismissed other-interested behavior as irrelevant to his 
problem. In so doing, he clearly indicated his intention not to rely on ethical 
solutions. 
 An ethics-minded economist, Buchanan found it unreasonable to simply 
dismiss such solutions and accordingly strove to establish their domain or 
relevance. When he came back to the free-rider problem in “Ethical Rules, 
Expected Values, and Large Numbers,” published in late 1965, Buchanan 
introduced group size, an important factor that was missing in his 1964 article 
and to which Olson (and to a lesser extent Boulding) attributed much 
significance. Group size determined an individual’s choice between two ethical 
rules—the moral law and the expediency criterion. Briefly, the probabilities 
assigned to the choice patterns of others—almost none follow moral law as 
rule; about one-half follow moral law as rule; and almost all follow moral law as 
rule—were said to vary with group size because in a small group the individual 
feels that his or her choice of an ethical rule influences others’ while it does not 
in a larger group. From this, Buchanan derived the idea that in general the 
individual who adopts the moral law in small-group interactions turns into a 
utility maximizer as soon as group size grows. As a result, although he or she 
may have interest in seeing a certain social state realized, the individual may 
still rationally act in a way that makes such an occurrence impossible. This 
situation, Buchanan described as the “large-group ethical dilemma” and 
illustrated as follows: 
 
Volunteer fire departments arise in villages, not in metropolitan centers. 
Crime rates increase consistently with city size. Africans behave differently 
in tribal culture than in urban-industrialized settings. There is honor among 
thieves. The Mafia has its own standards. Time-tested honor systems in 
universities and colleges collapse when enrollments exceed critical size 
limits. Litter is more likely to be found on main-traveled routes than on 
residential streets. Even the old adage, “Never trust a stranger,” reflects a 
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recognition of this elemental truth, along with, of course, additional ethical 
predictions (1965a, 8).xii 
 
 With the increase in group size attending social change, therefore, more 
frequent departures from the moral law and increasing adherence to the 
expediency criterion (associated with utility maximizing behavior) could be 
expected and with them a proliferation of free-rider situations. Interestingly, the 
distinction between ethical and utility maximizing behavior coincided with the 
differentiation between small-group and large-group situations, which in turn 
helped structure the study of the undesirable consequences of self-interested 
behavior in a changing society. With the increase in group size, individuals were 
confronted with a thorny question: “In the large-number group, who is my 
‘neighbor’?” The fact that Buchanan replied to this question with another one, 
“What are the possible means of factoring down complex social interaction 
systems into small-groups patterns?” (12), was an indication that, with the 
exception of small-group situations, economists ignored the possibility for 
individuals to get acquainted with one another’s subjective features through 
empathetic identification. Yet, it also suggested that for some economists there 
might be ways out the “large-group ethical dilemma,” which involved the “rule of 
moral law.” 
 Even if Buchanan’s treatment of public goods contained implications of other-
regardingness, the discussion of philanthropy continued to remain central to the 
study of unselfish behavior in the mid-1960s. Although his interest in the topic 
was rather circumstantial in 1961, Becker kept an eye on philanthropy and he 
had one of his students work on it from the fall of 1964.xiii Robert Schwartz, a 
Research Assistant at the NBER in 1963-64 while Becker was there, was 
interested in his work on discrimination. Becker convinced him to work on 
philanthropy, which he saw as an extension of the analysis of discrimination. In 
the spring of 1966, Schwartz defended his thesis—Private Philanthropic 
Contributions: An Economic Analysis (Conversation with Schwartz, 6 June 
2000). There he developed some ideas which Becker had touched upon in his 
“Notes on an Economic Analysis of Philanthropy,” defining philanthropic 
contributions as one-way transfers based upon no expectation of any quid pro 
quo and showing that private philanthropy was consistent with utility 
maximization. With one of his students working on philanthropy, Becker had 
greater motivation to explore further this research area especially as he was 
himself considering housework as a consumption activity in his new theory of 
the allocation of time. By March 1968, Becker had written “Interdependent 
Preferences: Charity, Externalities, and Income Taxation.” This mimeograph 
remained in draft form for some five years. 
 At about the same time he wrote “Interdependent Preferences,” Becker read 
Harold Hochman and James Rodgers’ “Pareto Optimal Distribution” for the 
American Economic Review (AER). The authors were at the University of 
Virginia when they jointly wrote their first draft in the fall of 1967. The idea of the 
article germinated while Hochman was preparing a course of public finance on 
the logic of progressive taxation and income redistribution at a time when 
Johnson’s Great Society programs in general and the war on poverty in 
particular had already achieved some success but not necessarily much effect 
in terms of income redistribution. Discussing with his students Musgrave’s 
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“three-part budget,” the question arose of whether some transfers that seemed 
to belong to the distribution branch could actually be moved in the allocation 
branch because they benefited both the giver and the recipient. Hochman and 
Rodgers, one of his students, eventually developed the idea into an article, 
which they submitted to the AER in early 1968, after having it read by 
Buchanan (Hochman to Fontaine, 10 April and 30 May 2000; Rodgers to 
Fontaine, 10 April 2000). 
 The thesis of the article was straightforward, “Pareto optimality, contrary to 
the orthodox approach to public finance, is not only consistent with but requires 
redistribution” (Hochman and Rodgers 1969, 543); it undoubtedly accounted for 
its significant impact in the profession. The authors maintained that 
redistribution could be justified without a social welfare function provided that 
utility interdependence was taken into account in formulating social policy. Just 
as the collective provision of public goods could be shown to be necessary for 
the attainment of Pareto optimality so could fiscal redistribution in the context of 
utility interdependence. On practical grounds, Hochman and Rodgers provided 
an interesting justification, which was reminiscent of Buchanan’s view of social 
change in American society:  
 
In rural areas, communities are smaller and social pressure to interact is 
consequently greater. Payment of income in kind is likely to be more 
common, and simple bilateral or multilateral transfers through private 
charity are more likely to be feasible, reducing dependence on the fiscal 
process as a redistributive mechanism. In urban areas social conditions 
may not fit this model as well. Urban poverty, moreover, is readily apparent 
to more individuals with relatively high incomes, and general 
interdependence among individuals in different income groups is by virtue 
of proximity even more pronounced. Fiscal machinery is more likely to 
enjoy a clear advantage as the mechanism of redistribution, because the 
social group is large and private arrangements that can overcome ‘free 
rider’ behavior to the degree required are more difficult to devise (1969, 
554). 
 
“Pareto Optimal Distribution” appeared in September 1969, following almost a 
decade of social disruption and a year of economic hardship in the U.S. With a 
presidency that hoped to limit government intervention in economic activity and 
a profession that had developed reservations about interventionist fiscal policy, 
the authors’ advocacy of progressive taxation could easily provoke reactions 
and so it did in the following years. Perhaps the most outstanding feature of the 
article, however, was its justification of the positive effects of redistribution on 
the basis of utility interdependence. Not only did Hochman and Rodgers provide 
a detailed examination of patterns of utility interdependence, but they also 
pointed to the beneficial effects to be expected from its better understanding in 
terms of policy making. 
 Boulding likewise recognized the significance of utility interdependence in 
economics but placed emphasis on the study of “one-way transfers.” Since the 
mid-1960s, he had been engaged in a study of the integrative system under a 
grant from the National Science Foundation, analyzing questions of status, 
identity, community, etc. In September 1967 he received another grant from the 
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Ford Foundation to work on what he called the “grants economy”—one-way 
transfers. Following his relocation to the University of Colorado at Boulder (CU), 
work on the grants economy started and by February 1968, Martin Pfaff, the 
other main investigator of the project, produced The Grants Economy: 
Unilateral Transfers in the U.S. and Global Economies, a research report with 
an introduction by Boulding. Subsequently, Boulding made arrangement to have 
an informal session on the grants economy at the meetings of the International 
Economic Association in Montréal in September 1968. After the meetings, 
Janos Horvath, who had written his dissertation on “A Comparative Appraisal of 
Economic Aid” at Columbia, wrote to Boulding and Pfaff: “the more immediate 
challenge still is . . . to pull together somehow the relevant building blocs 
scattered in the literature (Boulding, Schelling, [Anatol] Rapoport, [Albert] 
Hirschman, Banfield, and others).” In addition, he suggested “the formation of 
an Institute for the Study of Grant Economics which would coordinate and 
promote work in this field.” Some three months later, Boulding, Pfaff and 
Horvath formed the Association for the Study of Grants Economy (ASGE) at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (AEA) in Chicago.xiv 
 One could hardly think of a better occasion to launch the ASGE, especially 
since Boulding was President of the AEA that year. In effect, the presidency 
proved a liability. In August, during the Democratic Party Convention, local 
police had shown no restraint in quelling the agitation occasioned by hundreds 
of antiwar demonstrators. Many AEA members, shocked by police violence, 
had urged Boulding to move the meeting away from Chicago. In September, the 
fervent antiwar activist had nonetheless decided otherwise. In a letter to the 
partisans of relocation, he played the role of devil’s advocate: the “problem … is 
in the nature of the moral production functions—that is, what inputs produce 
what outputs? We all want to see a massive change in human behavior and 
institutions, away from violence, cruelty, malevolence and injustice towards a 
more gentle, benevolent, and just world. This is the output we want, but if we 
are honest as social scientists we must admit that there is much that we do not 
know about the inputs that are most likely to produce this result.”xv 
 By December 1968, Boulding had stopped supporting the Democratic Party 
though he had no sympathy for Nixon. His AEA presidential address, 
“Economics as a Moral Science,” betrayed some of his own and economics’ 
tensions. Building on his 1963 article, he came back to the three social 
organizers, namely the threat system, the exchange system and the integrative 
system: 
 
“Economics clearly occupies the middle one of these three. It edges over 
towards the integrative system insofar as it has some jurisdiction over the 
study of the system of one-way transfers of exchangeables, which I have 
called the ‘grants economy,’ for the grant, or one-way transfer, is a rough 
measure of an integrative relationship. On the other side, economics edges 
towards an area between the threat system and the exchange system which 
might be described as the study of strategy or bargaining ” (1969a, 4). 
 
Boulding concentrated on grants as expressions of the integrative relationship, 
though he was aware they could be associated with threat. While he criticized 
welfare economics for its reliance on selfishness and its subsequent neglect of 
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sympathy (and envy), Boulding made it clear that integrative forces went 
together with disintegrative ones: “We may feel indifferent towards those whom 
we do not know, with whom we have no relationships of any kind, but towards 
those with whom we have relationships, even the frigid relationship of 
exchange, we are apt to be either benevolent of malevolent. We either rejoice 
when they rejoice, or we rejoice when they mourn” (6). With social divisiveness 
at its height, Boulding had a good reason to remind his readers of the role of 
community in developing interdependence and prompting unselfish behavior, be 
it sympathetic or antipathetic. Subsequently, he contrasted two sets of common 
values guiding human behavior: the “economic ethic” and “heroic ethic.” 
Whereas the former type of decision making centers on cost-benefit analysis, 
understood as including the costs and benefits attached to the benevolence and 
malevolence of individuals toward each other, the latter emphasized the sense 
of identity of the individual more than the effects attached to his or her action. 
 As he became president of the AEA, Boulding had already turned into a 
general social scientist. This uncomfortable position, together with his unpopular 
decision, probably reinforced his sense of estrangement and explained the 
ambiguous conclusion of his presidential address: 
 
In this year of crisis I have also learned something about myself—that it is 
easier to make heroic decisions as a member of the [executive] committee 
than it is as a sole decision-maker and that heroism is much less 
appropriate in political than it is in personal decisions. The lessons of this 
year, therefore, are that the study of economics does not produce clods, 
even if perhaps the American Economic Association does not produce 
undue heroics. So we can hope at least that economics is one of the 
inputs that helps to make us human. If so, the benefits of this strange 
activity will be well worth its undoubted cost, even if in our heroic mood we 
dare not calculate them” (12). 
 
 One does not know if Buchanan, then a member of the AEA executive 
committee—split evenly on the question of moving the meeting—agreed with 
Boulding. Yet in the latter’s distinction between the economic ethic and the 
heroic ethic, he could easily recognize his own between the expediency 
criterion and the moral law. Since August 1968, following his resignation from 
the University of Virginia where he found himself in increasing disagreement 
with the administration, Buchanan had been at UCLA. At the economics 
department there, he joined Armen Alchian and William Allen (1964), who had 
included the idea that philanthropic behavior was consistent with standard 
economic theory in a textbook as of 1964. Jack Hirshleifer was there, too. The 
author of “Disaster Behavior: Altruism or Alliance?”—originally an internal 
document prepared for the RAND Corporation in 1967—had already written 
“Disaster and Recovery: An Historical Survey” for RAND in 1963. Although he 
denied any influence from an organized military research program, Hirshleifer 
(1963 [1987]) noted the connections between disaster research and the most 
outstanding threat of the age—nuclear war. In the second half of the 1960s, he 
was not alone in exploring the economic aspects of disaster. His 1967 article 
was actually a reaction to a paper by Howard Kunreuther and Douglas Dacy 
who, analyzing the consequences of the 1964 Alaska earthquake, argued that 
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unexpected market behavior could be explained on the basis of a flourishing of 
community feeling. Using an Olson-like argument, Hirshleifer (1967 [1987]) 
argued that benevolent behavior in disaster situations had less to do with 
community feeling than with the individuals’ self-interest in maintaining the 
alliance represented by society. Whatever the disagreements over the 
motivations of seemingly unselfish behavior, there was a shared interest in 
describing and predicting human behavior in post-disaster situations. Such an 
interest did not necessarily result from military preoccupations, but it certainly 
resonated with the increasing anxiety over nuclear destruction from the late 
1950s.xvi In any case, for many economists at UCLA, the analysis of unselfish 
behavior was not an end in itself. Accordingly, although Hirshleifer and Alchian 
and Allen (who were also connected with Rand) were not denying the 
importance of “altruistic” and philanthropic activities in society, they reached the 
conclusion that its treatment did not require a fundamental reconsideration of 
the behavioral assumptions of economic theory. 
 Buchanan had a more sophisticated view of unselfish behavior. After a year 
in California, he went to the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in 
Blacksburg, joining Tullock who had been there for a year, following his 
resignation from the University of Virginia, where no attempt was made to retain 
him, and a year’s stay at Rice. In November 1969, however, Buchanan returned 
to UCLA to present a paper that was based on conversations with Alchian. In 
the interim, Buchanan had read Alchian and Allen’s second edition of University 
Economics—the textbook referred to above. In his presentation, later published 
as “Professor Alchian on Economic Method,” Buchanan ([1969] 1979) 
considered the implications of Alchian and Allen’s admission that an individual’s 
utility function can include many noneconomic arguments, among which love 
and the welfare of others, as long as they qualify as “goods.” Although he 
regarded the sophistication of the utility function as a valuable development in 
the context of an expanding economic science, Buchanan likewise wondered 
whether limits could be imposed on the list of arguments susceptible to being 
considered for possible inclusion.xvii What made the explanation of 
“noneconomic” behavior possible was precisely its reduction to some economic 
dimension, namely, the logic of narrow self-interest. “This suggests,” Buchanan 
wrote, “that we are unable, as economic theorists, to develop hypotheses that 
will allow us to distinguish by behavioral observation between those persons 
who act according to their own narrow self-interest and those that behave in 
accordance with the ethical principles laid down by Kant” (70). In other words, 
although enriched utility functions said something about the outcome of human 
behavior, they said little about the variety of its motivations. Accordingly, 
Buchanan advised economists, who were prompt to include “noneconomic” 
arguments into the utility function, to be especially cautious when using 
economic theory for predictive purposes. To illustrate his argument, Buchanan 
mentioned what he called “the economics of charity or income redistribution,” a 
direct reference to the work by Virginia economists.xviii 
 With respect to the study of seemingly unselfish behavior, Buchanan, Tullock 
and other economists from Virginia had much in common with Boulding.xix In 
December 1969, several joint sessions were organized by the ASGE and the 
Public Choice Society at the Annual Meeting of the AEA in New York City and 
at that of the AAAS in Boston. At one meeting, Olson provided friendly, though 
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incisive, comments on Boulding’s analysis of the “grants economy.” In 
particular, he argued that most of the transfers classified as grants by Boulding 
could better be described as expenditures on public goods. Given Olson’s 
outlook, this amounted to dissociating the study of the “grants economy” from 
the reformulation of economics’ behavioral assumptions. After the two 
meetings, Boulding wrote to Musgrave: “We had good meetings both in Boston 
at the AAAS and in New York. Mancur Olsen [sic] and I had an excellent little 
debate which I think clarified a number of issues. It is rather rare for this to 
happen at meetings, as you know.”xx 
 Throughout the 1960s, the study of unselfish behavior remained the preserve 
of “a small ‘invisible college’,” with researchers working from different 
perspectives and in various directions. In the early 1970s, there was no such a 
thing as an economics of unselfishness yet, but after the article by Hochman 
and Rodgers (1969) in the AER pointed to the significance of utility 
interdependence, especially in terms of policymaking, an increasing number of 
economists took interest. Together with the continuing attention to philanthropy, 
as exemplified by the publication of Dickinson’s (1970) The Changing Position 
of Philanthropy in the American Economy, a long-delayed product of the NBER 
eponymous study, and Schwartz’s (1970) “Personal Philanthropic 
Contributions” in the fall of 1970, the reactions provoked by Hochman and 
Rodgers’s article, in particular Musgrave’s (1970), were clear indications that 
the study of unselfish behavior had now acquired more visibility in the 
profession.xxi So, in late 1970, Musgrave was probably not surprised to receive 
two manuscripts, “Avarice, Altruism, and Second Party Preferences” and 
“Interdependent Utilities and Pareto Optimality,” by R. Haney Scott and 
Lawrence Schall respectively, for possible publication in The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics (QJE). Scott applied indifference curve analysis to the study of 
unselfish behavior. In the process, he justified interdependence by the 
closeness of agents and, drawing on Boulding, noted that empathy played an 
important role in activating charity. Upon completing his draft, he asked Schall 
for advice and the latter, after complying, developed an article of his own on the 
same subject. After consulting referees, Musgrave accepted the two articles for 
publication in February 1971. Later, probably because he thought of them as 
valuable contributions to the ongoing debate on utility interdependence, income 
redistribution and Pareto optimality, he resolved to place the two articles into 
the lead position in the February 1972 issue of the QJE (Schall to Fontaine, 10 
April 2000; Scott to Fontaine, 2 May 2000).xxii 
 
 
2. Towards an Economics of Unselfishness 
 
Motivated by adverse circumstances, the 1962 conference was meant to 
correct the lack of knowledge about the economic aspects of philanthropy. It 
was hoped that information would thereby be gleaned that would help 
appreciate the role of private philanthropy in society. Ten years later, another 
conference was organized, this time with the objective of laying the first stone of 
a theory of “altruism.” Like its predecessor, this conference took place in a 
difficult political environment, with the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 
deepening the sense of uncertainty of foundations leaders and encouraging 
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them to defend philanthropy from any further threat. Yet, unlike its predecessor, 
it did not deal with an instance of seemingly unselfish behavior, but with 
“altruistic” behavior in general. Accordingly, the conference encouraged the 
emergence of an economics of unselfishness, with the “invisible college” 
gradually taking shape and its debates undergoing polarization.xxiii 
 
 
2.1. The March 1972 Conference 
 
In October 1971, a few weeks after he joined the Economics Department at 
Columbia, Phelps sent a 4-page grant proposal to Orville Brim, Jr., then 
President of the RSF, to ask his support for the organization of a conference on 
the “theory of altruism” to be held in New York City in March 1972. Phelps’s 
justifications for the significance of this gathering are worth mentioning. First, 
citing the examples of crime and war, Phelps regarded the “economics of 
altruism” as another effort in the extension of the domain of economics. It 
clearly was though significant variations appeared among the “imperialistic” 
outlooks of such researchers as Becker, Boulding and Buchanan. Second, 
echoing the pessimism of a number of books published in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, Phelps mentioned the “growing disenchantment with classical 
liberalism among economists as well as other social and political observers.” 
Following almost a decade of Democratic rule, the election of Richard Nixon in 
November 1968 might have raised expectations of lesser government 
intervention and greater reliance on the invisible hand of the market, but with 
the intensification of economic problems and persistence of social crisis in the 
late 1960, Nixon’s advocacy of a self-running country created growing 
skepticism. And Nixon himself ended up taking liberty with his own 
pronouncements. By the early 1970, therefore, only but a few economists 
showed unconditional adherence to the implications of classical liberalism. 
Finally, Phelps observed that the “theory of altruism” would be stimulated by the 
new developments affecting the treatment of markets in economic theory. In 
particular, he suggested that with the relaxation of the assumption of perfect 
information—an allusion to George Akerlof’s (1970) recently published “The 
Market for ‘Lemons’ ”—economists might be tempted to give more importance 
to unselfishness as a solution to opportunistic behavior. From the foregoing he 
concluded: “the time has arrived for a theory of altruism, and for a conference to 
give the theory a send off.”xxiv 
 After pondering on the theoretical timeliness of the conference, Phelps 
needed to consider possible participants. He had already contacted Arrow, Paul 
Samuelson and Vickrey, who all agreed to present a paper. Doubtless, these 
economists had already demonstrated their involvement in themes of related 
interest and the current preoccupations of the first two gave further evidence of 
their interest in the conference topic. Arrow (1972) was writing a review of 
Richard Titmuss’s (1970) The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social 
Policy—one of the most significant contributions to the theory of unselfishness 
among noneconomists in the 1970s. He had first proposed to write a paper on 
“Unrequited Transfers as a Basis of the Price System,” but having not finished it 
by the time of the conference, he eventually substituted the piece on Titmuss’s 
book for it. A brief, yet laudatory, note on this “remarkable, too-little known 
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book” had come out in Newsweek on 13 September 1971. Its author, 
Samuelson (1971) had probably discussed the book with his already 
longstanding colleague at MIT, Robert Solow (1971), who had himself published 
a long review of it in the Yale Law Journal in July 1971. Vickrey was not invited 
because of his earlier work on philanthropy, of which Phelps was unaware; yet, 
a senior member of the economics department at Columbia, Vickrey found it 
probably opportune to encourage an initiative which promoted a topic he had 
already explored some ten years ago (Phelps to Fontaine, 3 May 2000).xxv 
 Interestingly, Phelps’s original plan was to have the role of paper-givers 
assigned to economists and to ask other social scientists to provide comments. 
Phelps was “aware, as are other economists, that the subject of altruism is not 
new to social and political theorists” and he wanted “to ensure exposure to the 
contributions made in those fields.” It is debatable whether noneconomists were 
more advanced in the way of building a theory of unselfishness, but it seemed 
reasonable to anticipate more interest from those who gave less weight to the 
self-interest assumption in their theories of human behavior. Phelps’s proposal 
mentioned the following potential participants: “Among economists: Kenneth 
Boulding, Thomas Schelling, Gary Becker, James Mirrlees, Peter Hammond, 
Sydney Winter, Armen Alchian, Duncan Foley, Scott Boorman. Among 
noneconomists, John Rawls, Tom Nagel, Marshall Cohen, Erving Goffman, 
Edward Banfield, Bernhard Lieverman, Sidney Morgenbesser.” This list would 
probably surprise the present-day economist versed in unselfish behavior, but, 
to the historian of economics, this varied assemblage is nothing but an 
indication that what the economics profession has come to call “altruism” was in 
the early 1970s a heterogeneous body of knowledge comprised of disparate 
analyses of human behavior.xxvi 
 On the side of economists, researchers such as Buchanan and Sen were not 
cited but later attended the conference; others, like Boulding and Schelling, 
were mentioned but not invited. Among noneconomists, the name of Rawls, 
who had been associated with various debates on economic and philosophical 
issues throughout the 1960s and whose A Theory of Justice had come out in 
early 1971, comes as no surprise. And so does that of Nagel, who had written 
his dissertation at Harvard under the supervision of Rawls in 1963, and whose 
book, The Possibility of Altruism, had been published in 1970. Cohen, too, had 
some interest in the topic. As editor of the newly created Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, he had asked Arrow to write the review of Titmuss’s The Gift 
Relationship. Phelps had equally good reasons to mention political scientist 
Banfield. The author of The Moral Basis of a Backward Society had long been 
concerned with the role of moral values in economic performance and the 
distinction between family relationships and impersonal relationships. Some of 
the insights of his 1958 book were developed in The Unheavenly City, a 
controversial essay published in 1970, in which the problems of the American 
society came under scrutiny. As commentators, Phelps asked a professor of 
law, Guido Calabresi, and philosophers Edward McClennen, Morgenbesser and 
Nagel, to whom he added two economists, Karl Shell, Phelps’s former 
colleague at the University of Pennsylvania, and Sen whose interest in ethics 
was by then manifest. 
 Among the researchers mentioned above most moved in the same circles, 
investigated similar topics, read each other’s books and shared common 
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preoccupations. The vicissitudes of academic life notwithstanding, it is hardly 
surprising therefore that Phelps would think of these social scientists as 
possible participants to the New York conference. That the latter dealt with 
“altruism,” the definition of which was unclear even to Phelps himself, speaks 
volume, however, about the perceived significance of seemingly unselfish 
behavior in social science at a time when “the amount of divisiveness and 
conflict in society”—to use Olson’s words—occasioned some worry.xxvii  
 After reviewing Phelps’s proposal on 11 November 1971, the Board of 
Trustees gave its approval for the funding of the conference. Eventually, it was 
held the next March at the RSF. Following the conference, Phelps applied 
himself to the publication of its proceedings. After a cursory reading in October 
1973, the American sociologist David Sills concluded that “the contributors are 
good and the topic hot” and gave his approval. By the end of that year, Phelps 
had a complete volume.xxviii 
 
 
2.2. Meanwhile … 
 
After the March 1972 conference, Pfaff who, together with Boulding, was 
responsible for the edition of the series on grants economics for Wadsworth, 
wrote to the RSF to request that they send a copy of the program and of the 
papers presented, and pass on his letter to Phelps. In the letter, Pfaff recalled 
that “in the last four years or so [that is, since the creation of the ASGE] 
Kenneth Boulding and I have been studying, together with a growing band of 
associates, the nature of non-market transfer motivated by various admixtures 
of altruism and selfishness.”xxix Boulding, Horvath, Pfaff and his wife were 
actively working at the production and diffusion of ideas associated with the 
grants economy, organizing sessions at the AEA and AAAS, encouraging 
various people to work in that direction, themselves writing numerous 
introductory and explanatory articles, putting together collection of essays on 
the grants economy and exploring all possible variations on the theme. 
Boulding, in particular, was most active. At the time, he was working on The 
Economy of Love and Fear, an application of his view of society as comprised 
of three social organizers to the study of grants. Criticizing the study of the 
exchange system for itself, Boulding noted that grants occurred both in 
integrative and threat systems and accordingly argued that there were “two 
kinds of grants: one, gifts, arising out of ‘love’; and the other, tribute, arising out 
of ‘fear’ ” (1973, vi). A better understanding of the gift economy required 
redrawing borders between economics on the one hand and sociology and 
political science on the other; consequently, its study did not mean so much 
applying existing economic tools to “noneconomic” behavior” as using 
sociological and political insights into a reconstructed economics—integration of 
the social sciences rather than their unification around the self-interest 
motivation. 
 Boulding was not alone in taking note of the limitations of the self-interest 
model, but others were more specific in their call for reconsidering the economic 
theory of human behavior. One year after he participated in the “altruism” 
conference, Sen delivered his LSE inaugural lecture, “Behaviour and the 
Concept of Preference.” There he investigated the revealed preference 
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approach and offered valuable insights into the relationships between choices 
and individual preferences: 
 
The behaviour of human beings may involve a great deal more than 
maximizing gains in terms of one’s preferences and the complex 
interrelationships in a society may generate mores and rules of behaviour 
that will drive a wedge between behaviour and welfare. People’s behaviour 
may still correspond to some consistent as if preference but a numerical 
representation of the as if preference cannot be interpreted as individual 
welfare…. The rigid correspondence between choice, preference and 
welfare assumed in traditional economic theory makes the analysis simpler 
but also rules out important avenues of social and economic change. 
(1973, 253-54) 
 
 Contemplating the case where “there are strong environmental reasons for 
using glass bottles for distributing soft drinks” (254), Sen showed that the same 
choice (use and reuse of glass bottles) could correspond to four distinct cases 
in terms of the agent’s underlying preferences. The first three cases 
represented the preferences of a selfish, sympathetic and socially conscious 
individual, respectively; accordingly, they were consistent with utility theory, 
especially since economists were now using sophisticated utility functions. The 
fourth case, which Sen (1977) later associated with the notion of “commitment,” 
was of a different sort, however: “The person can do the ‘wrong’ thing on the sly 
without being noticed and he feels that if he did that he personally would be 
better off (even after taking note of whatever weight he might wish to put on the 
welfare of others), but he feels that he would be acting socially irresponsibly if 
he did proceed to do it, and therefore does not do so” (1973, 255). Moral 
considerations could therefore influence individual choice in such a way as to 
undermine the correspondence between choice and preference on the one 
hand and preference and welfare on the other. Not only did individual 
preferences prove a poor determinant of choice, but they did not necessarily 
bring about an improvement in the individual’s level of welfare. In Sen’s words, 
“the type of behaviour in question drives a wedge between choice and welfare” 
(259). The maximization framework with utility interdependence told some truth 
about seemingly unselfish behavior, not the only truth. Sen, but also Boulding 
and Buchanan, each in his own way, acknowledged the need for the self-
interest model to be supplemented with an ethically inspired model. 
 In the early 1970s, many students of unselfishness recognized the possibility 
of ethical motivations, but not all of them found ethics especially illuminating. At 
about the same time Sen’s LSE lecture was published in August 1973, Arthur 
Seldon, from the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), the London-based think-
tank, was completing the preface to The Economics of Charity: Essays on the 
Comparative Economics and Ethics of Giving and Selling, with Applications to 
Blood, a belated reaction to Titmuss’s The Gift Relationship. In his preface, 
Seldon, who had spent some time at LSE in the late 1930 at a time when Lionel 
Robbins’s view of the necessary dissociation of economics and ethics was 
becoming something of a reference, linked up the debate about the ethical 
dimension of human behavior with the development of the economics of 
unselfishness. Yet, he hastened to add that “although it is difficult to separate 
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the economics of giving from the ethics in some of the discussion, it is of central 
importance for economists” (1973, vi). In the theoretical part of the book, Seldon 
gathered contributions by some of the main protagonists of the economics of 
unselfishness. The collection of essays, which appeared at the end of March 
1974, endorsed a quasi-Robbinsian view of the relationships between 
economics and ethics and applied it to the analysis of giving. Unlike Sen 
(Boulding and Buchanan), the main contributors to the collection were doubtful 
about the possibility of learning something significant economically from an 
ethical approach to unselfish behavior; they preferred instead to explore the 
potentialities of utility theory. Anthony Culyer, in particular, associated free gift-
giving with “generosity”—understood as the outcome of an informed economic 
choice—and contrasted it with “altruism”—taken as concern for others’ welfare. 
His approach, he claimed, explained how to influence behavior by acting on the 
private costs and benefits paid and received by individuals.xxx 
 The part taken by Virginia economists in the study of unselfish behavior in 
general and philanthropy in particular was significant enough to arouse the 
interest of outsiders. Thus, a couple of months after the appearance of The 
Economics of Charity, “Achieving the Just Polity,” by Dennis Mueller (1974), 
came out in the Papers and Proceedings of the AER, after a session with 
Rawls, Mueller, Buchanan and Winston Bush had been organized on “Concepts 
of Distributional Equity” at the AEA annual meeting in December 1973. Written 
at the Center for Public Choice at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
University, Mueller’s article had benefited from discussion with some of the 
Center’s members, most notably Buchanan and Tullock. What made it most 
interesting in the context of the emerging theory of unselfishness was not 
merely its hot topic—theories of justice. On the latter, the contribution by Rawls 
(1974)—a highly respected student of ethical issues—could appeal more to an 
economic audience which had yet to digest the idea of the original position. 
Likewise, Buchanan and Bush’s (1974) contribution was probably more 
informative with regard to the theme of the session. The interest of Mueller’s 
article lay in its emphasis on one foundation of the theories of justice, “the 
prescription that one put one’s self in the other fellow’s shoes” (1974, 147). 
Boulding had flirted with the idea as early as 1961 and so Harsanyi (1955) had 
before him. Yet, it was to Mueller’s credit to integrate the insights of welfare 
economics and public finance theory to show the potential explanatory power of 
empathy. 
 Mueller (1973) was familiar with the welfare economics literature in which the 
imagined change of positions had long played a significant role (see Fontaine 
2001) and so he was with public finance which he had studied at Princeton 
while Musgrave was there (Mueller 1993, xiv). The publication of Rawls’s A 
Theory of Justice, with its idea of the original position, no doubt encouraged 
Mueller’s giving more attention to the empathy notion in the context of the 
collective provision of public goods. Typically, Mueller subjected the 
effectiveness of empathy to the individual’s knowledge about another, thus 
linking up the feasibility of the change of positions with group size. He did 
contemplate the theoretical possibility of empathy with outsiders but remained 
most skeptical about its practicality. And when he eventually conceded that the 
costs of knowing the preferences of others could be reduced with the spread of 
Western technology and culture, he stressed the dangers of an extended 
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empathy. More generally, he pointed to “one disturbing paradox. The 
developments—technological change, specialization, mobility, increasing 
education, urbanization—that produce the universal values that must underlie a 
just society are the same developments sociologists and psychologists list as 
causes of the identity crisis and anomie that supposedly characterize man in 
modern society” (Mueller 1974, 152). 
 Some fifteen years after the first studies on philanthropy, economists were 
undoubtedly showing greater interest in what was then often called “altruism,” 
but a unified theory was still lacking. The plurality of viewpoints reflected the 
varied motivations of researchers, some of them continuing to address the 
policy implications of philanthropy, others striving to renew the understanding of 
small-group interactions and still others discussing either the moral dimension 
of economic behavior or the economic dimension of moral behavior. In all these 
endeavors, however, there surfaced a preoccupation with the presumably 
positive collective consequences of unselfish behavior. In the literature studying 
it, there emerged dividing lines between the advocates of homo economicus 
and the supporters of homo ethicus, and between those who thought unselfish 
transfers across individuals made redistributive policies ineffective and their 
detractors. Those dividing lines began to consolidate in the mid-1970s with the 
publication of Becker’s “A Theory of Social Interactions” and Phelps’s Altruism, 
Morality, and Economic Theory. 
 
 
3. The Economics of Unselfishness in the Mid-1970s 
 
By the mid-1970s, Becker, Boulding, Buchanan, Vickrey and the main 
protagonists of the emerging theory of unselfishness had succeeded in 
incorporating it into the utility-maximization framework, but it was not in the 
main stream of economic analysis however.xxxi Their emphasis on the influence 
of others’ welfare on individual behavior and their interest in the use of 
microeconomic tools for the study of “noneconomic” phenomena did not arouse 
much enthusiasm in the profession. In the mid-1970s, however, a few 
contributions helped give the study of unselfish behevior more visibility within 
economics. 
 Not so long after Mueller’s article appeared in the AER, a note by Hochman 
and Rodgers (1974) came out in the September issue of the same journal, 
following various reactions to their “Pareto Optimal Redistribution.” There they 
responded to a critique by E. J. Mishan (1972) to the effect that the derivation of 
distributional propositions from allocative efficiency considerations was a rather 
uncertain enterprise, the shortcomings of which ranged from lack of operational 
value to undue reliance on utility interdependence and insufficient attention to 
ethics. In answering Mishan’s criticisms, Hochman and Rodgers reaffirmed their 
belief that “some redistribution might make everyone better off” and pointed to 
“utility interdependence as a rationale for income transfers” (1974, 752, 756). In 
trying to vindicate their position, they reiterated the significance of “psychic,” as 
opposed to “tangible,” externalities for the study of income transfers and 
exemplified their approach by referring to Becker’s (1969) still unpublished “A 
Theory of Social Interactions,” Schwartz’s (1970) JPE article on personal 
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philanthropic contributions and a work of theirs (1973) in which they submitted 
the assumption of utility interdependence to empirical test.xxxii 
 Some two months after the publication of the Hochman and Rodgers note, 
there appeared in the JPE Becker’s (1974) “A Theory of Social Interactions.” 
Originally titled “Interdependent Preferences: Charity, Externalities and Income 
Taxation,” this article was renamed, in September 1969, after Becker had read 
Hochman and Rodgers’s article for the AER—a change that betrayed Becker’s 
intention to broaden his frame of analysis from the issue of charity to the 
treatment of unselfish behavior in general. By the time he submitted his paper 
to the JPE in April 1974, following the submission of his colleague Robert 
Barro’s “Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?” to the same journal, Becker had 
made substantial revisions. In the process, he had had ample opportunity to 
explore some of the ramifications of utility interdependence in various contexts 
and to realize the growing significance of unselfishness in economic analysis 
(Becker to Fontaine, 3 June 2000). Becker’s and Barro’s articles appeared in 
the same issue at the end of the year. Barro was familiar with Becker’s work 
and although there is no reason to believe that his analysis of government 
budget deficits was a simple application of Becker’s “rotten kid” statement, it 
seems reasonable to assume at least some cross-fertilization, especially since 
the Becker manuscript had spent some six years in his files and Barro had 
commented on it. Becker also knew Barro’s article, a draft of which had been 
presented, in 1973, in the “Money and Banking” workshop run by Milton 
Friedman in Chicago. That Becker and Barro discussed unselfish behavior is 
evidenced by the fact that the latter’s wife suggested the phrase “rotten son” to 
the former who later turned it into “rotten kid” in his eponymous “theorem” 
(Barro to Fontaine, 3 April 2001).xxxiii 
 In his article, Becker recalled the central role of social interactions in other 
social sciences and cited in passing Durkheim, Simmel, Weber and a few 
others. While sociologists stressed the role of social norms in regulating gift-
giving, Becker thought of it as a problem of individual rationality and accordingly 
made gift-giving where expectation of reciprocation had no place compatible 
with utility maximization. Unlike what he called the “usual theory of consumer 
choice,” which places in the utility function of the giver his own consumption 
together with the amount of his charitable giving (Ui = Ui xi , h( )), Becker 
proposed a “social interactions” approach, which replaces the amount of 
charitable giving, h, with the beneficiaries’ consumption, as financed by their 
income and the amount of charitable giving they receive 
(Ui = Ui xi ,x j = I j + hpj
 
 
  
 
 
  
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  ). 
 In the context of the family, Becker reached the conclusion “that if a 
[benevolent] head exists, others members also are motivated to maximize 
family income and consumption, even if their welfare depends on their own 
consumption alone. This is the ‘rotten kid’ theorem” (1974, 1080). Against the 
background of the family breakup, Becker showed that the conditions for family 
cohesion were not so demanding as to require that all family members have 
sympathetic preferences or so unrealistic as to imply that all family members 
are selfish. Regarding the recipients of the head’s generosity, he endorsed 
Friedman’s (1953) influential argument and made it clear that only as if 
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“altruism” was involved. Yet, Becker left no doubt as to the “altruistic” 
preferences of the head: his transfers were said to result from sympathy and 
the latter was explained by the fact that “the marriage market is more likely to 
pair a person with someone he cares about than with an otherwise similar 
person that he does not care about” (1974, 1074, n). This justification made 
sense, but the failures of marriage in American society could put considerable 
strain on a theory that justified the lack of opportunistic behavior in a family by 
its head’s sympathetic preferences and the latter by the power of marriage to 
bring together people who cared for each other. 
 Assuming continuity between family and society, Becker extended his results 
to the “synthetic ‘family’ ” consisting of a charitable person and all recipients of 
his or her charity, and to a number of other multiperson interactions. Here 
again, the same result obtained: due to offsetting changes in transfers from the 
sympathetic benefactor, a redistribution of income among “members” did not 
change the welfare of any of them. This result appeared as a response to the 
idea that opportunistic tendencies may surface in groups characterized by the 
interactions of self-interested individuals; as such it echoed the question that 
had inspired unselfishness research at its outset, “How to achieve socially 
desirable outcomes on the basis of numerous self-interested actions?” Becker 
and a few others’ answer in the mid-1970s was to point to the sympathetic 
preferences of certain individuals in society. To many this answer will seem ad 
hoc today, but, at a time when much was said about the unresponsiveness of 
people to each other’s lot, it was counter-intuitive. Its political implications were 
however straightforward: due to offsetting private transfers, one could hardly 
count on social and economic policies to change the distribution of resources 
(see Barro 1974). 
 Retrospectively, it may be argued that “A Theory of Social Interactions” 
played a significant role in the history of unselfishness research. It should be 
remembered however that its main objective was to analyze the economic 
implications of interactions within various groups.xxxiv Phelps’s Altruism, 
Morality, and Economic Theory, by contrast, was meant as a contribution to the 
“theory of altruism;” as such it aimed at understanding a variety of behaviors, 
the motivations of which were seemingly unselfish. The collection appeared in 
1975 with essays by Arrow, William J. Baumol, Bruce R. Bolnick, Buchanan, 
Hammond, M. A. Pauwels, Phelps, McKean, Vickrey and Burton A. Weisbrod, 
and comments by Calabresi, McClennen, Nagel, Sen and Shell.xxxv While 
Becker had provided a coherent framework centered on maximization with utility 
interdependence to analyze social interactions, the various essays in Phelps’s 
collection illustrated the complexity of “altruism” as soon as one did not restrict 
oneself to the self-interest model. 
 Analyzing “altruism” in general, contributors were confronted with a great 
variety of behaviors and motivations; accordingly, they strove to classify them 
so as to identify their similarities and differences. When Arrow discussed 
Titmuss’s analysis of blood giving and its motives, for instance, he introduced a 
valuable distinction between benefiting from the satisfactions obtained by 
others, benefiting from one’s contributions to these satisfactions and the idea 
that “each performs duties for the other in a way calculated to enhance the 
satisfaction of all” (1975, 17), but he refrained from providing an economic 
translation of Titmuss’s reference to a sense of obligation to strangers. Arrow 
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acknowledged the possibility that individuals may act according to a categorical 
imperative, but noted: “I should add that, like many economists, I do not want to 
rely too heavily on substituting ethics for self-interest” (22). Others in the volume 
were probably more willing to take note of ethical motivations if only because 
they could thereby justify opposition to governmental regulation in various 
areas. McKean, once a colleague of Buchanan at the University of Virginia, 
emphasized the importance of ethical rules but did not necessarily link them 
with “altruism”, which he even equated with “non-rule-oriented unselfishness” 
(1975, 36). While he seemed reasonably confident about the influence of a 
number of factors for the creation and survival of ethical codes, McKean 
confessed to knowing little about “altruism” besides its definition in terms of 
utility interdependence or enlightened self-interest and the leverage on behavior 
it suggested. In his well-known “The Samaritan’s Dilemma,” Buchanan (1975) 
lent himself to the study of what he saw as a social disease of Western 
societies. A longtime advocate of the significance of ethical rules in economic 
life, Buchanan showed that the expectation of other-oriented behavior could 
lead the potential beneficiary to behave opportunistically, creating a form of 
exploitation at the social level. What made his approach especially interesting is 
that it associated the undesirable consequences of a variety of “altruistic” 
behaviors with the prevalence of the expediency criterion in society and 
recommended therefore commitment à la Schelling as a solution to the 
“Samaritan’s Dilemma.” In other words, after making the Samaritan’s behavior 
an expression of utility maximization with utility interdependence, Buchanan 
argued that the fact that “acting parties behave in ways different from those 
indicated by direct and apparent self-interest” (80) might remedy the 
unfavorable outcomes occasioned by the “Samaritan’s dilemma.” At the same 
time, he observed that with the increase in group size in modern societies and 
the individuals’ loss of power to influence each others’ behavior, adherence to 
preselected rules could not but diminish.xxxvi 
 With the two papers, by Phelps and by Hammond, the difficulties in finding a 
place to “altruism” in economic theory were still palpable and with them the 
temptation to simply make ethical considerations a part of the self-interest 
model. Phelps considered intergenerational transfers, with the amount of the 
bequest depending on how its consumption will be distributed over future 
generations. He found that “some restrictive convention, or the existence of a 
prevailing ‘ethic’ ” (1975, 8) helped determine the game-equilibrium growth path. 
Hammond, on the other hand, examined the possibility that seemingly unselfish 
behavior, notably charity, can arise from egoism and found that hypothesis 
confirmed to some extent. 
 Finally, the last three essays in the volume came back to the issue of 
philanthropy, which had partly motivated the study of seemingly unselfish 
behavior in the early 1960s. Once again, Vickrey issued reservations about the 
tax system relating to private philanthropy. Weisbrod’s paper likewise 
addressed some of the questions raised in the philanthropy conference of June 
1961, notably that of “the appropriate ‘division of labor’ among government, the 
market, and private philanthropy, in meeting human needs most effectively” 
(see infra, 9-10). In his effort “Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Non-Profit 
Sector in a Three-Sector Economy,” he stressed the necessary role of that 
sector as supplement to the provision of public goods by government. The last 
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paper in the volume drew on social psychology to build a “behavioral” theory of 
philanthropic behavior. Of particular interest for our purpose is Bolnick’s 
acknowledgement that a number of writers had “rendered such behavior 
susceptible to the traditional tools of economic analysis” and his concomitant 
remark that “a more fundamental issue is uncovered: What types of motivation 
underlie philanthropic activity?” (1975, 197). Interestingly, Bolnick pointed to the 
difference between trying to understand seemingly unselfish behavior and 
studying the consequences of the inclusion of utility interdependence in the 
maximization framework in terms of equilibrium conditions. The latter approach, 
he saw as “unsatisfying as a behavioral theory” (198) and accordingly argued 
that social rewards and psychological consistency had to be taken into account 
not only for small groups but also for larger ones. In the process, Bolnick 
inevitably mentioned the justification in terms of empathetic identification, as 
suggested by Boulding (1962) and Vickrey (1962), but expressed his 
uneasiness with the limitation of the notion to close-knit groups. Here Bolnick 
stumbled against the usual separation of home and market in economic 
theory.xxxvii Still he concluded: “An individual may be motivated not only by the 
direct social pressures . . . but also by identification with certain persons or 
groups, whether or not these relationships involve direct contact” (213). 
 Despite serious efforts to go beyond the self-interest model, Altruism, 
Morality, and Economic Theory failed to determine with clarity the 
characteristics of a “commitment model.” The fact that ethical considerations 
had to be taken into account in the analysis of seemingly unselfish behavior did 
not seem to imply that the self-interest model failed on most accounts or that 
another model could claim greater explanatory power. It is understandable 
therefore that in his Introduction to the volume, Phelps asked: “Can altruistic 
behavior be fit into some version of the economist’s beloved model of utility 
maximization subject to constraints? Or must that model be importantly 
modified and hooked up to some complementary body of analysis to yield a 
satisfactory product?” (1975, 2).xxxviii Which direction unselfishness theory 
would take was still unclear in 1975, but the issue would soon be clarified as a 
result of the proliferation of unselfishness studies, some resorting to the utility-
maximization framework, some doing without it. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
When addressing economists about the place of “altruism” in their subject, a 
typical reaction is: “Oh well, utility interdependence has long been around.” And 
so it has since Edgeworth ([1881] 1967, 53n) offered its first modern formulation 
in the late nineteenth century. Asked about the reintroduction of “altruism” into 
contemporary economics, however, the same researchers would probably point 
to “A Theory of Social Interactions.” As we have seen, Becker’s article was a 
belated sequel to a work written in the early 1960s at a time when a handful of 
economists took the occasion of a NBER study to articulate their views on 
philanthropy. That we should emphasize 1961 rather than 1974 (or 1975) as the 
reference year for the renewed interest in unselfishness is of no minor 
consequence for its historical study. It helps shift emphasis away from the two 
well-known results of the JPE article, namely the invariance proposition and the 
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“ ‘rotten kid’ theorem,” to the sheer diversity of unselfishness research in the 
preceding period. On this view, “A Theory of Social Interactions” represented 
but one of the two orientations characterizing the study of seemingly unselfish 
behavior in the mid 1970s, though the one that later came to be looked upon as 
mainstream “altruism” research. 
 In their multiplicity, the efforts to account for unselfish behavior accompanied 
the destabilization of economists by the failures of the invisible hand in western 
societies. Yet, in the 1960s only a few economists—mainly those interested in 
reconsidering the content of the utility function and in investigating topics at the 
intersection of economics and other social sciences—took seemingly unselfish 
behavior seriously. Later, especially after the publication of Becker’s article and 
Phelps’s collection of essays, an increasing number of economists came to the 
analysis of unselfish behavior. Often unaware of the various motivations and 
characteristics of unselfishness research before 1975 but glad to be able to use 
the theoretical framework systematized by Becker and others, most of them 
immersed themselves in “altruism” research without the feelings of 
apprehension of their predecessors, positing the essentially economic character 
of unselfish behavior. The fact that after 1975 the utility maximization 
assumption often guided the study of unselfish behavior is then no surprise. For 
those aware of the context of prior developments, however, this turn shows that 
the price paid by the discipline to incorporate unselfish behavior was a 
minimization of its ethical dimension. 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
i. Reference to “unselfishness” implies that we are not merely interested in what 
most present-day economists call “altruism”—that is, positive utility interdependence—
and which Amartya Sen (1966), in the tradition of Edgeworth, aptly described as 
“sympathy” or concern for the welfare of others, but in the various representations of 
seemingly unselfish behavior in economics. Our account does however include 
“sympathy” in “unselfishness” and therefore departs from Sen (1973, 1977) who, in his 
anxiety to show that “commitment” is not just another word for describing situations of 
utility interdependence, observed that “behavior based on sympathy is in an important 
sense egoistic” (1977, 326), that is, benefits to the sympathizer. It could equally be 
argued that it is in an important sense altruistic, that is, is motivated by the welfare of 
another. 
ii. By the early 1980, Howard Margolis remarked: “Almost all the models of altruism 
in the economic literature are goods models” (1982, 22).  
iii. Becker (1961), Boulding (1962), Vickrey (1962) and Phelps (1975) are not 
referenced in Susan Rose-Ackerman’s (1996) article on altruism and nonprofits in the 
JEL, whereas Becker’s article of 1974 is. 
iv. Fabricant to Young, 14 April 1958; Young to Fabricant, 21 May 1958; Fabricant 
to Young, 6 October 1958; Fabricant, “Memorandum on a Study of the Changing 
Position of Philanthropy in the Economy,” 6 Oct. 1958, p. 4; Young to Fabricant, 25 
November 1958; Fabricant to Young, 16 March 1959; and Carson to Young, 7 October 
1959, folder 516, box 59, Studies in Philanthropy, Russell Sage Foundation Archives, 
Rockefeller Archive Center, North Tarrytown, New York (hereafter designated 
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RSFARAC). Stanton Wheeler (1994, 98) noted that philanthropy “became one of the 
areas of program commitment for the Russel Sage Foundation during the 1950s. Indeed, 
in the eyes of one observer, the three major references groups for Dr. Young during his 
tenure as president were sociologists, philanthropists, and people in medicine. Thus, 
throughout Young’s regime there were studies of philanthropy, including [F. Emerson] 
Andrews’ own Philanthropic Giving (1950), Corporation Giving (1952), Attitudes 
Towards Giving (1953), Philanthropic Foundations (1956), and Legal Instruments of 
Foundations (1958).” Philip Mirowski and Esther-Mirjam Sent (2005) note that with 
the government crackdown on private foundations and the increasing impact of the 
federal government on higher education and science, most foundations had to revise 
their ambitions concerning the management of science. 
v. Carson to Members of the Advisory Committee on Philanthropy Study, 23 Oct. 
1959; Dickinson, “Notes for Meeting on November 9, 1959 of Advisory Committee on 
Philanthropy Study,” pp. 1-2 and 5-6 respectively; Dickinson, “The Changing Position 
of Philanthropy in the American Economy,” 20 May 1960; Fabricant to Arthur F. Burns 
and alii, 8 Dec. 1960, folder 516, box 59, Studies in Philanthropy, RSFARAC. The 
exchanges between Fabricant and Boulding make it clear that with regard to the 
economists’ contributions the main objective of the conference was to have theoretical 
papers dealing with the policy issues bearing on philanthropy. In a letter to Boulding, 
Dickinson noted that the “problem of working philanthropy into utility theory is an 
interesting challenge:” see Fabricant to Boulding; 7 Dec. 1960, Boulding to Fabricant, 
11 Dec. 1960; Fabricant to Boulding, 20 Dec. 1960; and Dickinson to Boulding, 5 June 
1961, Box 24, Folder “Conference on Philanthropy,” Kenneth Boulding Papers, Bentley 
Historical Library, University of Michigan (hereafter designated KEBUM Papers). 
Curti’s (1957) “The History of American Philanthropy as a Field of Research,” 
published in the American Historical Review, is regarded as “the first announcement to 
the historical profession of the importance of research in foundation philanthropy” 
(Barry Karl 1999, 288; see also Lucy Bernholz 1999, 359-360).  
vi. While a positive correlation between A’s utility level and B’s consumption level 
can be taken to indicate A’s philanthropic behavior, a negative correlation may indicate 
A’s discrimination against B. In terms of utility interdependence, philanthropy and 
discrimination are but the two sides of the same coin. 
vii. Dickinson, “Preliminary Statement Regarding Philanthropy Conference, June 
1961,” 8 Dec. 1960, folder 516, box 59. After the conference, Young and Fabricant 
conferred on the opportunity to put together the papers. Young opposed the idea 
because he considered that the material proposed for the collection was “quite uneven.” 
Fabricant decided to go ahead all the same (Fabricant to Young, 29 Jan. 1962; Young to 
Fabricant, 6 Feb. 1962; Fabricant to Young, 27 Feb. 1962, folder 517, box 60, Studies 
in Philanthropy, RSFARAC. 
viii. Vickrey, too, used the term “empathy” but in the sense of concern for the 
welfare of others. Before Boulding used the imagined change of positions in the 
analysis of philanthropy, others economists, such as Vickrey (1945, 1960) and Harsanyi 
(1955), had used it in welfare economics (see Fontaine [2001]). Yet, interestingly, 
neither Vickrey nor Harsanyi nor the many other welfare economists who used the 
empathy notion in the context of utility interpersonal comparisons, explored its virtues 
for the study of unselfish behavior. 
ix. On the debates that were relevant to Boulding’s analysis of the gift, especially the 
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controversy between the “substantivists” and the “formalists,” see Mirowski (1994).  
x. From the late 1940 to the late 1950s, Buchanan (1949, 1954a, 1954b) had 
demonstrated a clear understanding of the central issues of the public finance and 
welfare economic literatures. For an examination of his contribution to “public choice 
theory” and issues of related interest see Steven G. Medema (2000) and Sonja Amadae 
(2003, especially Ch. 3). Amadae notes the significance of Kenneth Arrow’s 1951 
Social Choice and Individual Values in prompting Buchanan to write the two essays of 
1954. 
xi. The Calculus of Consent by Buchanan and Tullock (1962), his colleague at the 
University of Virginia from 1958, had just come out. Following its publication, the two 
authors organized a meeting in Charlottesville in October 1963 to which they invited 
several scholars who were working at the intersection of economics and politics, 
notably Olson, Downs, John Rawls and Roland McKean. This meeting later gave rise to 
the Public Choice Society and the journal Public Choice (see Buchanan 1995). For a 
detailed account of the professionalization of public choice analysis see Medema 
(2000). 
xii. As suggested by Buchanan himself, his analysis in terms of groups may also 
have been influenced by James Q. Wilson and Banfield’s (1964) important article, 
“Public-Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior.” It is interesting to note 
that in the latter self-interest, narrowly conceived, is equated with maximization of 
one’s family income. For another example of his interest in group size in the mid-
1960s, see Buchanan’s (1965b) theory of clubs. 
xiii. At almost the same time, Michael Taussig, an economics graduate student at 
MIT started to work on philanthropy at the suggestion of Daniel Holland who had just 
received a large body of tax data and who enlisted a few students to make use of it. 
Funnily enough, it is this gift that arose interest in philanthropy at MIT, for otherwise 
the determinants of philanthropic behavior did not seem to attract much attention there. 
Taussig (1965) submitted his Ph.D. thesis, The charitable contributions deduction in the 
federal personal income tax, in August 1965, with E. Cary Brown and Holland as first 
and second readers, and Charles Kindelberger completing the committee (Taussig to 
Fontaine, 2 June 2000). 
xiv. In the late 1960s, Boulding’s published work imperfectly reflected his interest in 
one-way transfers. To what has already been mentioned, however, should be added 
Boulding (1967a, 1967b). Horvath to Boulding and Pfaff, 24 Sept. 1968, Folder 
“Correspondence with Janos Horvath,” box 153, Kenneth Boulding Papers, University 
of Colorado at Boulder Libraries, Boulder, Colorado (hereafter designated BPUCB). In 
the fall of 1969, the creation of the ASGE was publicized in Public Choice, edited by 
Tullock, an emanation of Papers on Non-Market Decision Making created in 1966. 
xv. Boulding, “A special letter from the President of the American Economic 
Association to those members who have urged us to move the December 1968 meeting 
away from Chicago,” 28 Sept. 1968, Folder “Historical Note from the President, 1968,” 
box 17, BPUCB. 
xvi. From the mid-1960s the economics of disaster really took off, focusing on the 
effects of disaster on unselfish behavior. The connections with conflict analysis were 
strong, as most works on disaster were conducted either at RAND or the Institute for 
Defense Analyses, Arlington, Virginia (see Louis De Alessi 1967, 1968; Hirshleifer 
1967; Kunreuther 1967; Dacy and Kunreuther 1969; and Christopher Douty 1972). On 
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the various explanations of postdisaster cooperation see Alessi (1975). 
xvii. At the time, Tullock (1972) was finishing up “Economic Imperialism: The 
Tendency of Economics to Take over Everything,” which he presented at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in 
December 1969 and was later included in Theory of Public Choice edited by Buchanan 
and Robert Tollison. Regarding Buchanan’s and Tullock’s issues with the University of 
Virginia see discussion in Medema (2007). 
xviii. A couple of months earlier, the article by Hochman and Rodgers, “Pareto 
Optimal Distribution,” had come out in the AER. Likewise, David Johnson and Thomas 
Ireland, who had written their doctoral dissertations—The Fundamental Economics of 
the Charity Market and Charity Budgeting under the supervision of Tullock and 
Buchanan, respectively—were already working on The Economics of Charity published 
under the auspices of the Center for Study of Public Choice in 1970, with a foreword by 
Tullock (1971), who was then writing the draft of “The Charity of the Uncharitable.” 
xix. In the wake of the creation of the ASGE, Boulding (1969b) stressed the 
intersection set between grants economy and public choice in a short article which 
Tullock, the editor of Public Choice, included in one of its the first issues. To Pfaff, 
Boulding wrote: “The more I think about it, the more I wonder whether we should not 
simply amalgamate the incipient Association for the Study of the Grants Economy with 
the Public Choice Society, as this is an on-going concern and our interests have such a 
large area of overlap. Perhaps the non-intersecting parts of the sets could easily be taken 
care of. The one thing that worries me is that the Public Choice Society does not have a 
very international outlook, which I think is really needed; on the other hand, I suppose 
it might be pushed in that direction and I am sure that Tullock would not be averse to 
this” (Boulding to Pfaff, 3 March 1969, Folder “Correspondence with Martin Pfaff,” 
box 153, BPUCB). 
xx. Boulding responded orally to Olson’s critique and two months later he developed 
his rejoinder in “The Network of Interdependence,” delivered at the meetings of the 
Public Choice Society in Chicago, which Boulding sent to Buchanan, Olson, Vincent 
Ostrom and Tullock prior to the conference. Boulding to Musgrave, 8 Jan. 1970, box 
78, folder “MURAKAMI NUNLIST,” BPUCB. 
xxi. Musgrave’s reaction was but one among many that mostly appeared in the AER 
in the early 1970s. The impact of the article by Hochman and Rodgers is less 
perceptible now that the use of utility interdependence has deserted the analysis of 
income distribution in society to the study of transfers within families and groups. 
xxii. In support of their idea that government intervention might be necessary to 
achieve a Pareto optimum, both Scott (1972, 18) and Schall (1972, 24) closed their 
article with a reference to the AER article by Hochman and Rodgers. Scott’s article was 
one of the first economics articles to use the term “altruism” in its title. After 1972, the 
term acquired wider currency in economics. 
xxiii. Although the conference on “altruism” may have benefited from the 
recognized significance of philanthropy studies at RSF—philanthropy was one the 
“eight major areas of foundation activity” during Brim’s presidency (Wheeler 1994, 
109)—there is no reason to think that it was seen as a direct contribution to that 
research area. 
xxiv. Phelps to Brim, 19 Oct. 1971, folder 493, box 57, Studies in Philanthropy, 
RSFARAC. 
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xxv. To this day, Arrow has not put this project of article on paper, but when asked 
what he meant by it, he explains: “it is an old idea of mine,” which has something to do 
with his interest in “the judicial system, trust, and the like” as they “are essential to the 
very logic of an economic system” (Arrow to Fontaine, 31 May 2000). This idea was 
somewhat developed in the Fels lectures for 1970-71, in particular, Chapter 1 entitled 
“Rationality: Individual and Social,” in which Arrow (1974, 24) stressed the importance 
of “social feelings, trust, and empathy.” For a detailed account of the reception of The 
Gift Relationship in economics see Fontaine (2002). 
xxvi. Phelps to Brim, 19 Oct. 1971, folder 493, box 57, Studies in Philanthropy, 
RSFARAC. The contributions of social psychologists in the late 1960s showed, 
however, that interest in seemingly unselfish behavior (helping) could be positively 
correlated with the significance of the selfishness assumption in a subject. Phelps to 
Brim, 19 Oct. 1971, folder 493, box 57, Studies in Philanthropy, RSFARAC. 
xxvii. A political philosopher, Rawls had nonetheless a good understanding of 
economic theory and his discussion with economists largely preceded the “altruism” 
conference. The seminar he organized with Arrow and Sen at Harvard in 1968 is 
testimony to Rawls’s engagement with rational choice theory (see Amadae 2003, 258-
73). 
xxviii. Brim to Phelps, 1 Dec. 1971. After the Board at the RSF considered the 
Phelps proposal, a trustee perceptively observed: “The word ‘altruism’ is not too well 
chosen…. For example, I do not regard a butcher who refrains from short-weighing a 
‘benevolent’ butcher. Imperfect information is not limited to areas of discrimination, 
unsafe factories, gouging, and Smithian short-weighing butchers. We need not rely on 
the opposite of altruism in order to develop a theory of altruism” (William Greenough 
to Brim, 19 Nov. 1971, folder 493, box 57, Studies in Philanthropy, RSFARAC). Sills 
to Hugh Cline [the new President of the RSF], 31 Oct. 1973, folder 493, box 57, Studies 
in Philanthropy, RSFARAC. 
xxix. Pfaff to Sheldon, 31 Jul. 1972, folder 493, box 57, Studies in Philanthropy, 
RSFARAC. 
xxx. Among the contributors, Alchian adapted an extract from Exchange and 
Production—which he had co-authored with Allen—in which they showed that 
philanthropy was consistent with utility maximization; Tullock (1971) had “The Charity 
of the Uncharitable” of December 1971 reprinted for the occasion; Culyer (1971), who 
had already made a significant contribution to the economics of giving in the context of 
the analysis of medical care and who had been in close contact with economists from 
the University of Virginia through the IEA, produced an original piece, “Quids Without 
Quos—A Praxeological Approach.” Finally, Ireland and Johnson each made a 
contribution to the volume: the former by adapting an article of his published in the Fall 
1969 issue of Public Choice; the latter by drawing on his dissertation to write on the 
theory and practice of the charity market. For a detailed account of the book and its 
origins see Fontaine (2002, 425-9). 
xxxi. There were, of course, the attempts to expand the equilibrium notion to cases 
with utility interdependence. These works, however, dealt with the implications of 
utility interdependence for the Pareto optimality of competitive equilibrium, not with 
the analysis of unselfish behavior per se. A telling illustration is Geoffrey Brennan 
(1973) who showed that the question of Pareto desirable redistribution can be 
considered by examining the implications of envy and malice, rather than generosity.  
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xxxii. Hochman and Rodgers’s article stemmed from a suggestion by Henry Aaron. 
Dismissing the reservations raised by the attempts of Tullock and others in that 
direction, let alone their own misgivings, Hochman and Rodgers decided to use 
charitable contributions as a proxy and eventually produced “Utility Interdependence 
and Income Transfers through Charity” (Hochman to Fontaine, 16 June 2000). 
xxxiii. Barro to Becker, 19 April 1974 (in possession of Becker). Barro explained: 
“Once this connection became clear [to me], George Stigler—then my co-editor of the 
Journal of Political Economy—proposed that Gary’s paper on social interactions appear 
together with mine in the November/December issue of the journal” (1998, 47-48). 
xxxiv. Interestingly, Stefano Zamagni’s (1995) anthology, The Economics of 
Altruism, includes “Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and 
Sociobiology” (Becker 1976) and “Altruism in the Family and Selfishness in the 
Market Place” (1981), but leaves aside “A Theory of Social Interactions.” 
xxxv. Baumol’s contribution, which had already been published elsewhere, was a 
late addition to the volume and Pauwels’s, a simple mathematical note on Phelps’s own 
contribution. 
xxxvi. Rapoport (1960, 60-47) studied parasitism in relation to co-operation in the 
context of a production and exchange model with and without utility interdependence. 
He wrote that “[t]he only ‘ethics’ which leads to the attainment of maximum joint 
utility in the model of society we have considered is the ‘egalitarian ethic,’ in which the 
concern for self and for other are of equal weight” (73). Interestingly, he added that 
although there is no parasitism with two isolated agents whose individual utility 
functions valorize only the arguments related to the other, the social outcome associated 
with that situation remains nonetheless unfavorable.  
xxxvii. A remarkable illustration of such a separation can be found in Becker’s 
(1981) “Altruism in the Family and Selfishness in the Market Place” (1981) and, more 
generally, in most contemporary work on “altruism” (see, for instance, Oded Stark’s 
(1995) Altruism and Beyond: An Economic Analysis of Transfers and Exchanges within 
Families and Groups. 
xxxviii. Jean-Jacques Laffont’s (1975) attempt to sketch a Kantian economics stands 
as an interesting illustration of the tensions associated with the representations of 
seemingly unselfish behavior in the discipline in the mid-1970s. Interestingly, Laffont 
saw the homo economicus paradigm as assuming selfish, not self-interested, agents and  
accordingly contrasted this characterization with a kind of “Kantian” behavior. 
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